Ingbirchworth
The Methodist Chapel roll of honour of those that service in the Second World War lists 17 names, and although not shown as such includes one casualty. The roll now resides in a local shop since the closure of the chapel.
Ernest Roebuck
Additional details
Ernest Roebuck (295263)
Lieutenant - South Staffordshire Regiment - 2nd Airborne Bn.
19 September 1944, aged 24
Born in Penistone on 8 May 1920
Son of Edwin and Mary Roebuck, of Ingbirchworth, Yorkshire.
9 Oct 1943 commissioned into the Royal Regiment of Artillery [emergency commission], 23 Jan 1944 transferred to The South Staffordshire Regiment. In Sept 44 - Officer Commanding, 21st Platoon (D Company), 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment
Lived at Ash Lea, Ingbirchworth, Penistone-
Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery
The gravestone carries the inscription - Beloved son Of Edwin and Mary Roebuck Of Ingbirchworth, Penistone, Yorkshire
Originally buried at Arnhem (Isolated) Nr St Elizabeth Hospital Sheet 6 NW MR 736779 before being reburied in present location on
23 August 1945
Died during Operation Market Garden
[also listed on Penistone Grammar School memorial]
Lieutenant - South Staffordshire Regiment - 2nd Airborne Bn.
19 September 1944, aged 24
Born in Penistone on 8 May 1920
Son of Edwin and Mary Roebuck, of Ingbirchworth, Yorkshire.
9 Oct 1943 commissioned into the Royal Regiment of Artillery [emergency commission], 23 Jan 1944 transferred to The South Staffordshire Regiment. In Sept 44 - Officer Commanding, 21st Platoon (D Company), 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment
Lived at Ash Lea, Ingbirchworth, Penistone-
Arnhem Oosterbeek War Cemetery
The gravestone carries the inscription - Beloved son Of Edwin and Mary Roebuck Of Ingbirchworth, Penistone, Yorkshire
Originally buried at Arnhem (Isolated) Nr St Elizabeth Hospital Sheet 6 NW MR 736779 before being reburied in present location on
23 August 1945
Died during Operation Market Garden
[also listed on Penistone Grammar School memorial]
Notes
On the 17th September the 2 South Staffords were ready to take off for Holland as a battalion of the 1st Air Landing Bde, 1st Airborne Division. For various reasons it was due to be landed in two lifts, the 1st under Lieut-Col. W.D.H. McCardie consisting of Bn H.Q., B Coy (Maj R.H. Cain) and D Coy (Maj J.E. Phillp), one pl MMG and HC Mortar Pl on 17th September; while the 2nd lift comprising the remainder of the Bn under Maj J.C. Commings came in on the 18th September. The 1st lift was concentrated at Manston, Kent, while the 2nd lift was at Brize Norton, Oxfordshire, ready to take off from Broadwell airfield close by. Morale throughout the unit was extremely high, despite the fact that they had been continually briefed and debriefed for operations, which had subsequently been cancelled, during the previous three months, and the continual 'keying up' for operations might well have affected the men.
The 1st lift took off from Manston at 1030 hrs. Flying conditions were extremely good and the trip was a great deal more peaceful than many exercise flights. The huge escorting fighter force did its job splendidly. With two exceptions the gliders arrived almost dead on the landing zone at Reijers Camp (6681). There was a certain amount of flak as they approached but only a few of the gliders were hit. The two missing gliders were those carrying Maj R.H. Cain with B Coy HQ and one pl of B Coy (Lieut J. Sharp). The former was cast off over England and landed back near Canterbury; the latter broke its tow rope over enemy occupied Holland and came down near Tilburg. Its arrival caused the Germans to report that there were extensive air landings taking place in that area; they apparently carried out some demolitions. The landing was made safely, but the pl itself was unable to rejoin the allied armies. During the next six weeks it made several moves and lay up for long periods, finally rejoining complete when the 2nd Army advanced into Boxtel.
There was practically no opposition to the landing at Reijers Camp apart from one or two isolated MGs which were soon dealt with. D Coy had two killed and seven wounded, the latter including Lieut J.E. Hardman-Mountford. About 20 Germans, who did not show much fight, were taken prisoner. The role of the 1st lift was to secure the landing zone for the arrival of the 2nd lift and the Bn therefore dug in with B Coy in the area 650810 and D Coy in the area 657818, the latter detaching on pl to protect Bde HQ at 663807. One section each of MMGs and Mortars were placed under command of coys, the remainder being with Bn HQ at 663815. The Border Regiment was holding a similar locality to the South, and the K.O.S.B. to the NW. The whole layout in the area was thus based on a series of defending localities. There were sounds of a good deal of firing from the direction of Arnhem but no opposition developed in the bn area and all ranks spent a quiet night.
The 18th September also started fairly quietly while the bn prepared to wait for the arrival of the 2nd lift. However, orders were received about 0900 hrs to move to Arnhem with the object of forcing a way through to relieve the paratroops of the 1st Bde who had seized, and were holding out at, the road bridge. The bn accordingly moved off at about 1030 hrs. The order of march was, D Coy, supporting arms, Bn HQ, B Coy (Capt R.S. Foot MC). The route lay through Wolfhezen, which had been much battered by RAF Lancasters the day before, and thence Southward to join the main Utrechtscheweg at X roads 678784. Although there were still a few scattered snipers about, the first real opposition came from German fighters which straffed the road when the bn was near the Hotel Wolfhezen (6779). Fortunately, there were very few casualties from this attack. When the bn entered the built up area about X roads 702783 they picked up a fair number of stragglers from the 1st Para Bde who had with them a major and three subalterns. They were unable to give much information as to what lay ahead, although it appeared that opposition had grown much stiffer since their leading troops had passed through. At about 1300 hrs the head of the bn was just moving down into the valley about 711781 when heavy MG fire was opened from the high ground around Mariendaal and immediately South of the rly about 713784. It appeared also that the line of trees running due South from Mariendaal to the Utrechtsche Weg was held.
At the same time odd snipers in houses on both sides of the road between the line? of the valley and the road junc 706782 came to life and started to be a nuisance. D Coy cleared off some snipers immediately threatening the road, and then began to work up the line of trees towards Mariendaal to clear the opposition. This proved difficult as the Boche posts were well hidden and well sited and it became clear that they could make little progress without incurring a good many casualties. The C.O. was not anxious to commit them fully, as his task was to get on into Arnhem and if it proved difficult to disengage D Coy it left him only one weak coy, with which to try and get through, until the 2nd lift arrived. It was already quite obvious that the Germans had used the 24 hrs between the original landing and the advance of the South Staffords to strengthen their defences of the approaches to Arnhem very considerably and it looked as if a push down the main road in daylight with the small force available would not have much hope of success. Recce was carried out for an alternative route and one was found from road junc 706782 through rly bridge 711774, but even so it would be difficult to use this road in daylight unless D Coy remained in their position to keep down the Boche MGs. Eventually at 1730 hrs B Coy with Bn HQ and support pls moved round by this route, the early stages of their move being covered by D Coy from their position at about 709783. They reached road junc 724776 as it was just getting dark and there met about 70 paratroops under command of Lieut-Col. Dobie, 1st Parachute Bn. This increased the rifle strength which Lieut-Col. McCardie had available by nearly 80% but Lieut-Col. Dobie's party had been fighting hard and were very exhausted. Fairly heavy MG fire was coming down from the area of Diependaal (7278) and the high ground about 729785 but it was mostly high; there was also a certain amount of fire coming from the houses in Arnhem immediately along the proposed line of advance. Col. McCardie appreciated that severe street fighting lay ahead and he considered it unwise to attempt an advance into the town until the remainder of his bn had joined up.
D Coy started to pull out to follow the remainder of the 1st lift at 1830 hrs. It took them some time to disengage and by the time they arrived at the rly bridge it was dark. They had meanwhile been joined by A Coy (Maj T.B. Lane) from the 2nd lift. In the conditions existing Maj Lane, senior coy comd, considered it unwise to advance further in the darkness until he knew what was happening in front. He therefore went forward and contacted Col. McCardie. Both coys then moved up and joined the C.O's party about midnight. B Coy established themselves south of the road about 723776 and D Coy North of the road at about 723777, A Coy remaining on the line of the road behind them. Meanwhile the 11th Para Bn, which was intended to support the South Staffords in their advance to the bridge, came up in rear of A Coy.
The 2nd lift had taken off from Broadwell at about 1030 hrs and all it gliders arrived safely by 1530 hrs. Maj R.H. Cain and B Coy HQ party accompanied this lift. There seemed to be rather more opposition in the L.Z. area than there had been when the 1st lift arrived, probably as German snipers had infiltrated in, and one pl of C Coy under Lieut D.K. Edwards was detached to unload a glider which had crash landed about 660821; this involved a minor pl action as it was under MG fire from the edge of the woods at 656826 and 660823. The task was however successfully completed.
As soon as possible the 2nd lift moved off to join up with the rest of the bn. The advance guard was formed by A Coy, with a section of mortars under command, while the main body consisted of C Coy (Maj P.R.T. Wright) and the bn tpt, one pl C Coy moving in rear. Lieut Edwards' pl had not rejoined when they moved off. The progress was slow as there was a good deal of other traffic on the road and a certain amount of general confusion existed. Some delay was also caused by snipers about the X-rds 696784. Unfortunately A Coy somehow got too far ahead of the main body, and the 11th Para Bn seems to have got in between it and the remainder of the column. It arrived at the road junc 706782 just as the tail of D Coy was moving down to rejoin the 1st lift; their subsequent moves have already been dealt with above.
The remainder of the 2nd lift did not learn about the detour as Maj Commings had no wireless communication working with the C.O. and on arriving at the head of the valley below Mariendaal at about 2030 hrs they moved on down the main road. The Germans were still in position, and when C Coys head was at about 713781 they opened up on fixed lines on to the road. The leading pl of C Coy (Lieut J. Badger MC) tried to push on through the lines of trees at 715782 but Maj Commings, appreciating that his role was to get his party up to the bn and not to become involved in a separate battle, decided at once to withdraw from the valley and recce for an alternative route. C Coy subsequently took up almost exactly the same positions as D Coy had held during the afternoon, while the transport vehicles were reversed and brought clear of the valley. This took some time and meanwhile Maj Commings went back to Div HQ in order to try and find out the exact location of the bn. Eventually about 0330 hrs the 2nd lift moved forward again by the same route as that taken by other parties, and about 0500 hrs came up with the tail of the 11th Para Bn at about 718776. During this move forward there was no real opposition although some trouble was experienced from Spandaus firing on fixed lines from the area of Den Brink 720779 and also from across the river. Casualties had been very light, while the strength had been increased by certain stragglers from para units which had been picked up.
Meanwhile the bn had started its advance towards the Arnhem bridge by the main road at approx 0430 hrs. The order of march being D Coy, B Coy, A Coy. The parachute detachment under Lieut-Col. Dobie was meanwhile to move along the river bank parallel to the South Staffords. 11th Para Bn moved in rear of the Staffords to support them if necessary. In the early stages the advance went well, although there was a certain amount of opposition from scattered parties of the enemy in houses, while MGs from the high ground were firing on fixed lines down side streets and straight along the road from the NE. 20mm guns had also been sited to bear on road junctions etc. At about 0500 hrs D Coy met a strong post of the enemy in the vicinity of the hospital 729779. This was quickly cleared up, but by then the strength of the coy had been reduced to about 60%. Casualties included Maj Phillp and Lieut Erskine wounded and Capt Wyss and Lieut Roebuck killed.
On the 17th September the 2 South Staffords were ready to take off for Holland as a battalion of the 1st Air Landing Bde, 1st Airborne Division. For various reasons it was due to be landed in two lifts, the 1st under Lieut-Col. W.D.H. McCardie consisting of Bn H.Q., B Coy (Maj R.H. Cain) and D Coy (Maj J.E. Phillp), one pl MMG and HC Mortar Pl on 17th September; while the 2nd lift comprising the remainder of the Bn under Maj J.C. Commings came in on the 18th September. The 1st lift was concentrated at Manston, Kent, while the 2nd lift was at Brize Norton, Oxfordshire, ready to take off from Broadwell airfield close by. Morale throughout the unit was extremely high, despite the fact that they had been continually briefed and debriefed for operations, which had subsequently been cancelled, during the previous three months, and the continual 'keying up' for operations might well have affected the men.
The 1st lift took off from Manston at 1030 hrs. Flying conditions were extremely good and the trip was a great deal more peaceful than many exercise flights. The huge escorting fighter force did its job splendidly. With two exceptions the gliders arrived almost dead on the landing zone at Reijers Camp (6681). There was a certain amount of flak as they approached but only a few of the gliders were hit. The two missing gliders were those carrying Maj R.H. Cain with B Coy HQ and one pl of B Coy (Lieut J. Sharp). The former was cast off over England and landed back near Canterbury; the latter broke its tow rope over enemy occupied Holland and came down near Tilburg. Its arrival caused the Germans to report that there were extensive air landings taking place in that area; they apparently carried out some demolitions. The landing was made safely, but the pl itself was unable to rejoin the allied armies. During the next six weeks it made several moves and lay up for long periods, finally rejoining complete when the 2nd Army advanced into Boxtel.
There was practically no opposition to the landing at Reijers Camp apart from one or two isolated MGs which were soon dealt with. D Coy had two killed and seven wounded, the latter including Lieut J.E. Hardman-Mountford. About 20 Germans, who did not show much fight, were taken prisoner. The role of the 1st lift was to secure the landing zone for the arrival of the 2nd lift and the Bn therefore dug in with B Coy in the area 650810 and D Coy in the area 657818, the latter detaching on pl to protect Bde HQ at 663807. One section each of MMGs and Mortars were placed under command of coys, the remainder being with Bn HQ at 663815. The Border Regiment was holding a similar locality to the South, and the K.O.S.B. to the NW. The whole layout in the area was thus based on a series of defending localities. There were sounds of a good deal of firing from the direction of Arnhem but no opposition developed in the bn area and all ranks spent a quiet night.
The 18th September also started fairly quietly while the bn prepared to wait for the arrival of the 2nd lift. However, orders were received about 0900 hrs to move to Arnhem with the object of forcing a way through to relieve the paratroops of the 1st Bde who had seized, and were holding out at, the road bridge. The bn accordingly moved off at about 1030 hrs. The order of march was, D Coy, supporting arms, Bn HQ, B Coy (Capt R.S. Foot MC). The route lay through Wolfhezen, which had been much battered by RAF Lancasters the day before, and thence Southward to join the main Utrechtscheweg at X roads 678784. Although there were still a few scattered snipers about, the first real opposition came from German fighters which straffed the road when the bn was near the Hotel Wolfhezen (6779). Fortunately, there were very few casualties from this attack. When the bn entered the built up area about X roads 702783 they picked up a fair number of stragglers from the 1st Para Bde who had with them a major and three subalterns. They were unable to give much information as to what lay ahead, although it appeared that opposition had grown much stiffer since their leading troops had passed through. At about 1300 hrs the head of the bn was just moving down into the valley about 711781 when heavy MG fire was opened from the high ground around Mariendaal and immediately South of the rly about 713784. It appeared also that the line of trees running due South from Mariendaal to the Utrechtsche Weg was held.
At the same time odd snipers in houses on both sides of the road between the line? of the valley and the road junc 706782 came to life and started to be a nuisance. D Coy cleared off some snipers immediately threatening the road, and then began to work up the line of trees towards Mariendaal to clear the opposition. This proved difficult as the Boche posts were well hidden and well sited and it became clear that they could make little progress without incurring a good many casualties. The C.O. was not anxious to commit them fully, as his task was to get on into Arnhem and if it proved difficult to disengage D Coy it left him only one weak coy, with which to try and get through, until the 2nd lift arrived. It was already quite obvious that the Germans had used the 24 hrs between the original landing and the advance of the South Staffords to strengthen their defences of the approaches to Arnhem very considerably and it looked as if a push down the main road in daylight with the small force available would not have much hope of success. Recce was carried out for an alternative route and one was found from road junc 706782 through rly bridge 711774, but even so it would be difficult to use this road in daylight unless D Coy remained in their position to keep down the Boche MGs. Eventually at 1730 hrs B Coy with Bn HQ and support pls moved round by this route, the early stages of their move being covered by D Coy from their position at about 709783. They reached road junc 724776 as it was just getting dark and there met about 70 paratroops under command of Lieut-Col. Dobie, 1st Parachute Bn. This increased the rifle strength which Lieut-Col. McCardie had available by nearly 80% but Lieut-Col. Dobie's party had been fighting hard and were very exhausted. Fairly heavy MG fire was coming down from the area of Diependaal (7278) and the high ground about 729785 but it was mostly high; there was also a certain amount of fire coming from the houses in Arnhem immediately along the proposed line of advance. Col. McCardie appreciated that severe street fighting lay ahead and he considered it unwise to attempt an advance into the town until the remainder of his bn had joined up.
D Coy started to pull out to follow the remainder of the 1st lift at 1830 hrs. It took them some time to disengage and by the time they arrived at the rly bridge it was dark. They had meanwhile been joined by A Coy (Maj T.B. Lane) from the 2nd lift. In the conditions existing Maj Lane, senior coy comd, considered it unwise to advance further in the darkness until he knew what was happening in front. He therefore went forward and contacted Col. McCardie. Both coys then moved up and joined the C.O's party about midnight. B Coy established themselves south of the road about 723776 and D Coy North of the road at about 723777, A Coy remaining on the line of the road behind them. Meanwhile the 11th Para Bn, which was intended to support the South Staffords in their advance to the bridge, came up in rear of A Coy.
The 2nd lift had taken off from Broadwell at about 1030 hrs and all it gliders arrived safely by 1530 hrs. Maj R.H. Cain and B Coy HQ party accompanied this lift. There seemed to be rather more opposition in the L.Z. area than there had been when the 1st lift arrived, probably as German snipers had infiltrated in, and one pl of C Coy under Lieut D.K. Edwards was detached to unload a glider which had crash landed about 660821; this involved a minor pl action as it was under MG fire from the edge of the woods at 656826 and 660823. The task was however successfully completed.
As soon as possible the 2nd lift moved off to join up with the rest of the bn. The advance guard was formed by A Coy, with a section of mortars under command, while the main body consisted of C Coy (Maj P.R.T. Wright) and the bn tpt, one pl C Coy moving in rear. Lieut Edwards' pl had not rejoined when they moved off. The progress was slow as there was a good deal of other traffic on the road and a certain amount of general confusion existed. Some delay was also caused by snipers about the X-rds 696784. Unfortunately A Coy somehow got too far ahead of the main body, and the 11th Para Bn seems to have got in between it and the remainder of the column. It arrived at the road junc 706782 just as the tail of D Coy was moving down to rejoin the 1st lift; their subsequent moves have already been dealt with above.
The remainder of the 2nd lift did not learn about the detour as Maj Commings had no wireless communication working with the C.O. and on arriving at the head of the valley below Mariendaal at about 2030 hrs they moved on down the main road. The Germans were still in position, and when C Coys head was at about 713781 they opened up on fixed lines on to the road. The leading pl of C Coy (Lieut J. Badger MC) tried to push on through the lines of trees at 715782 but Maj Commings, appreciating that his role was to get his party up to the bn and not to become involved in a separate battle, decided at once to withdraw from the valley and recce for an alternative route. C Coy subsequently took up almost exactly the same positions as D Coy had held during the afternoon, while the transport vehicles were reversed and brought clear of the valley. This took some time and meanwhile Maj Commings went back to Div HQ in order to try and find out the exact location of the bn. Eventually about 0330 hrs the 2nd lift moved forward again by the same route as that taken by other parties, and about 0500 hrs came up with the tail of the 11th Para Bn at about 718776. During this move forward there was no real opposition although some trouble was experienced from Spandaus firing on fixed lines from the area of Den Brink 720779 and also from across the river. Casualties had been very light, while the strength had been increased by certain stragglers from para units which had been picked up.
Meanwhile the bn had started its advance towards the Arnhem bridge by the main road at approx 0430 hrs. The order of march being D Coy, B Coy, A Coy. The parachute detachment under Lieut-Col. Dobie was meanwhile to move along the river bank parallel to the South Staffords. 11th Para Bn moved in rear of the Staffords to support them if necessary. In the early stages the advance went well, although there was a certain amount of opposition from scattered parties of the enemy in houses, while MGs from the high ground were firing on fixed lines down side streets and straight along the road from the NE. 20mm guns had also been sited to bear on road junctions etc. At about 0500 hrs D Coy met a strong post of the enemy in the vicinity of the hospital 729779. This was quickly cleared up, but by then the strength of the coy had been reduced to about 60%. Casualties included Maj Phillp and Lieut Erskine wounded and Capt Wyss and Lieut Roebuck killed.